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Abstract
Over ten years of a debate about the best ways to make banks safer have led to the 
conclusion that improving their risk culture is one venue to achieve this goal. Conse-
quently, different disciplines discuss topics related to risk culture from varying meth-
odological angles. This effort of many scholars provides a rich basis of theoretical 
and empirical evidence to guide business practice and improve regulation. However, 
the application of many approaches and methods can result in fragmentation and 
loss of a comprehensive perspective. This paper strives to counteract this fragmenta-
tion by providing a comprehensive perspective focusing particularly on the embed-
dedness of risk culture into banks’ management control systems. In order to achieve 
this goal, we apply a systematic literature review and interpret the identified findings 
through the theoretical lens of management control research. This review identifies 
103 articles, which can be structured along three categories: Assessment of risk cul-
ture, relation between risk culture and management controls (with the subcategories 
embeddedness of risk culture in overall management control packages, risk culture 
and cultural controls, risk culture and action controls, risk culture and results con-
trols, as well as risk culture and personnel controls) and development of banks’ risk 
culture over time. Along these categories the identified findings are interpreted and 
synthesized to a comprehensive model and consequences for theory, business prac-
tice and regulation are derived.
Keywords Management control systems · Risk culture · Risk climate · Systematic 
literature review
JEL Classification D81 · D91 · M14 · M38 · M48
 * Jennifer Kunz 
 jennifer.kunz@wiwi.uni-augsburg.de
 Mathias Heitz 
 matthias.heitz@gmail.com
1 Chair for Controlling, Augsburg University, Universitätsstraße 16, 86159 Augsburg, Germany
 J. Kunz, M. Heitz 
1 3
1 Introduction
The banking and economic crisis of 2007/8 resulted in the call for a fundamen-
tal change of banks’ professional norms (e.g., Cohn et al., 2017; Palermo et al., 
2017; Pan et al., 2017; Power et al., 2013) and regulators started to emphasize the 
concept of risk culture in their standard setting (e.g., Carretta et al., 2017; Euro-
pean Banking Authority (EBA), 2017; Financial Stability Board (FSB), 2014).
As risk culture is part of qualitative regulation, those standards considering 
this topic provide a wide range of qualitative recommendations, covering internal 
controls, like remuneration, but also soft factors, like open communication (e.g., 
FSB, 2014). This qualitative character of risk culture and the related recommen-
dations to establish it in a reasonable way, constitute a major challenge for banks: 
As literature on management controls stresses, corporate culture – and thus also 
a firm’s risk culture as part of this corporate culture – constitutes a socially con-
structed management control system (Bedford & Malmi, 2015; Malmi & Brown, 
2008; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2017), and it is embedded into a whole set 
of further management controls (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2017). Thus, when 
trying to develop an appropriate risk culture, banks have to cope with the need 
to change socially constructed entities and they have to consider and understand 
the mentioned embeddedness in whole sets or packages of management controls. 
Moreover, banks are confronted with partly contradicting external requirements, 
e.g., there is a strong tension between market and regulatory demands (Lim et al., 
2017), which in turn result in contradicting demands with respect to risk behav-
ior. If such complexities are neglected, the application of particular instruments 
to establish a reasonable risk culture might miss the intended effect (Power et al., 
2013).
Due to this need for deeper insights into how risk culture can be implemented 
and managed successfully and sustainably in banks, since the last financial crisis 
scholars devoted increasing attention to this topic. For example, they discussed 
issues as diverse as the impact of incentive systems (Gande & Kalpathy, 2017; 
Iqbal & Vähämaa, 2019; Schnatterly et al., 2019) or the way to measure risk cul-
ture (e.g., Sheedy, 2016; Sheedy et  al., 2017). Within these emerging research 
fields different methods and theoretical perspectives are applied. This differentia-
tion fosters a pluralistic perspective on banks’ risk culture and thereby provides 
the possibility to develop a broad set of recommendations for business practice 
and regulation. However, it also bears the risk of fragmentation and mitigates the 
development of a comprehensive view on banks’ risk culture. Particularly, as dif-
ferent authors stress different building blocks to achieve a proper risk culture, it is 
difficult to select and prioritize the relevant building blocks. This is all the more 
true since regulators do not show causal relationships between individual build-
ing blocks in their papers, but rather list them individually. Moreover, scholars 
disagree on the relation between certain instruments and risk culture. For exam-
ple, Stulz (2016) discusses incentives and culture as two distinct measures to 
influence prudent risk-taking, while McConnell (2013) mentions remuneration 
as integral component of risk culture. Finally, in the wake of the last financial 
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crisis, the discussion on risk culture became ethically inflated, as an inadequate 
risk culture is seen as an important reason for misconduct. In summary, there are 
many reasonable views on risk culture in banks, but they need to be integrated 
to develop a more coherent understanding that allows banks to develop their risk 
culture in an appropriate direction.
The present paper aims to provide insights for such a coherent understanding by 
focusing particularly on the embeddedness of risk culture into banks’ management 
control systems. In order to achieve this goal, we apply a systematic literature review 
and interpret the identified findings through the theoretical lens of management con-
trol research. When defining a clear-cut inclusion criterion for the considered arti-
cles in this review, we have to consider that this field of research is still under devel-
opment. In order to cover the relevant literature, we selected those articles which 
simultaneously deal with risk culture and management control systems or particular 
elements of these systems both in the sense of explicitly combining them but also in 
the sense of discussing them in a less related way. Thus, we consider both articles 
which explicitly strive to understand risk culture in relation to management control 
systems and articles which at least point to the fact, that risk culture has to be under-
stood in the broader context of (elements of) management control systems, without 
necessarily providing the precise relations between them. The application of this 
systematic literature review allows the structured discussion of recommendations 
for business practice and regulation as well as the derivation of promising paths for 
future research. Thereby, the analysis mitigates increasing fragmentation and helps 
to direct future research effort to existing blind spots.
On the one hand, our study extends the mainly interpretative research in manage-
ment control literature that aims to foster the understanding of effective practices to 
achieve an appropriate risk culture (e.g., Mikes, 2009, 2011; Power, 2009). By com-
bining evidence from this literature with further insights from other research streams 
on risk culture, we broaden the perspective and provide a comprehensive view on 
risk culture as management control system and its embeddedness within other man-
agement control systems. This makes our study one of the few analyses that deal 
explicitly with the relationship between risk culture and management control sys-
tems. On the other hand, we provide evidence to enhance theory and business prac-
tice on risk culture in banks by compiling the current state of research, bringing 
together the most important findings and highlighting existing research gaps. Par-
ticularly, we discuss in detail issues related to the assessment of risk culture, the 
relation between risk culture and other management controls and the possibility 
to change risk culture. Moreover, we provide a comprehensive model relating risk 
culture to other management control systems in order to disentangle their complex 
relationships. From these insights, we draw recommendations for business practice, 
regulators, education and research.
The remaining paper is structured as follows: To lay the ground for the follow-
ing analysis, in Sect. 2 we derive a definition of risk culture within banks and relate 
it to management control research. Based on this combination we elaborate on the 
relevant categories to be analyzed in order to derive the intended comprehensive 
view. Section 3 provides detailed information regarding the procedure to identify the 
relevant literature for the systematic literature review. Section 4 covers the results 
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of the systematic review and in Sect. 5 we discuss these results. Section 6 contains 
concluding remarks and the discussion of the limitations.
2  Risk culture and management controls
According to Schein (1990) organizational culture is the derivative of organizational 
learning processes through which particular norms and behavioral patterns have 
evolved that served to solve problems in the past. It “may be defined as the shared 
basic assumptions, values, and beliefs that characterize a setting and are taught to 
newcomers as the proper way to think and feel, communicated by the myths and 
stories people tell about how the organization came to be the way it is as it solved 
problems associated with external adaptation and internal integration” (Schneider 
et al., 2013, p. 362). As a consequence, organizational culture is a dynamic organi-
zational phenomenon whose content can change over time dependent on organiza-
tional learning within changing environments due to external pressure und internal 
processes. Risk culture forms part of the overall organizational culture and describes 
the way an organization takes and manages risk (e.g., Australian Prudential Regula-
tion Authority (APRA), 2016). Similar as overall organizational culture, also risk 
culture develops according to learning processes related to external and internal 
determinants, as exhibited by relevant definitions.
One frequently cited definition is applied by the Institute of International Finance 
(IIF) (2009), which is also used by the FSB (2014) and the APRA (2016). They 
define risk culture as “the norms and traditions of behavior of individuals and of 
groups within an organization that determine the way in which they identify, under-
stand, discuss and act on the risks the organization confronts and the risks it takes” 
(IIF 2009, p. 35). According to the Institute of Risk Management (IRM) (2012, p. 7) 
risk culture comprises “the values, beliefs, knowledge and understanding about risk, 
shared by a group of people with a common intended purpose, in particular the lead-
ership and employees of an organization.” Another well-known definition of risk 
culture as “bank’s norms, attitudes and behaviors related to risk awareness, risk-tak-
ing and risk management and controls that shape decisions on risk” is provided by 
the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2015, p. 2). Overall, these 
definitions stress the importance of individual perceptional and cognitive processes 
in combination with social interactions for the evolution of a bank’s risk culture.
The literature further states that different organizations also can have different 
risk cultures (IRM 2012). Moreover, as the norms and traditions related to risk cul-
ture are formed via shared experiences over time, and these experiences are driven 
by various external factors, also various sets of shared norms and traditions within 
organizations are possible.
However, despite the possible differences between risk culture across and within 
banks, the FSB (2014) suggests four core elements that support a sound risk culture 
in each bank: tone from the top, accountability of employees, adequate incentives 
and effective communication and challenge. The IRM (2012) adds further aspects, 
like the commitment to ethical principles or risk event reporting. These aspects are 
part of an overarching management concept that is anchored in the bank’s internal 
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management control systems. Thus, as also outlined by the APRA (2016) in addi-
tion to the less formal psychological and social processes mentioned above, formal-
ized systems also have an influence on the orientation of risk culture.
Finally, the adequacy of a particular risk culture must always be assessed in the 
light of a bank’s business model. Regulators expect banks to implement a prudent 
risk culture, which does not necessarily mean that banks should be as risk-averse 
as possible. Rather, it is intended to promote a risk behavior that only allows the 
bank to take acceptable risks, so that it can prosper sustainably and does not get into 
financial difficulties (e.g., FSB, 2014).
Overall, the mentioned definitions stress that risk culture refers to a general 
organizational attitude towards risk and its handling. It constitutes the shared experi-
ences of individuals and comprises norms, values, traditions, and attitudes, which 
lead to particular activities related to the handling of risk and its consideration in 
decision processes. It is formed through the interaction between informal psycho-
logical and social processes, formal instruments, like reward systems, and external 
circumstances, like regulation. Risk culture is therefore an elusive phenomenon, the 
development of which is difficult to predict. Nevertheless, regulators expect banks 
to exert a targeted influence on their risk culture and to develop it in an appropri-
ate direction, i.e. in a manner that fits to their business model and does not result in 
financial distress.
Management control systems can be defined as a collection of practices that are 
intended to align staff’s decision-making and action taking with overall organiza-
tional goals (e.g., Anthony, 1965; Berry et al., 1995; Chenhall, 2003; Gooneratne & 
Hoque, 2013). While in older research a more objective perspective on management 
controls can be observed, more recently scholars stress that management control 
systems “are also viewed as socially constructed phenomena within the particular 
context in which they operate; being subjected to wider social, economic and politi-
cal pressures” (Gooneratne & Hoque, 2013, p. 147). Given this definition, on the 
one hand, it becomes clear that literature of management controls can help to make 
sense of banks’ risk culture and its relation to the mentioned instruments as well 
as to foster its active development into an adequate direction. On the other hand, 
according to this literature, culture is its own management control system (Malmi 
& Brown, 2008; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2017). Thus, a deeper understanding 
of risk culture, as a particular part of culture, also can inform management control 
research. Especially it can add insights to the growing research stream on manage-
ment control systems in banks (Gooneratne & Hoque, 2013). In order to achieve 
both goals, we derive three issues, which are to be clarified by the systematic litera-
ture review.
First, the idea of management controls is closely related to the idea of making 
issues relevant to organizational goal achievement assessable. At first glance, this 
statement seems to be at odds with the previously derived definition of risk culture 
and the conclusion that it is an elusive phenomenon. Moreover, particularly authors 
from the field of management controls, like Power (2009) and Mikes (2009), are 
rather critical regarding a culture of assessment or even precise measurement in the 
context of risk culture. However, in order to embed the active management of risk 
culture within banks, this management process has to be conceptualized in a way 
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that fits to the general thinking within this industry. The banking industry not only 
has to cope with qualitative but also with quantitative regulation, which still results 
in a clear focus on measurable aspects. Moreover, in order to learn about possible 
progress made in developing an adequate risk culture (i.e. a risk culture that fits 
the selected business model), banks need clear benchmarks. Consequently, possible 
ways of assessing risk culture constitute the first category of the following system-
atic literature review. In detail, we elaborate on existing assessment instruments in 
extant literature and on the need for future research.
Second, as previously discussed, to achieve a risk culture that fits to the selected 
business model, regulators as well as recent literature propose to implement certain 
instruments, like appropriate incentive systems, adequate communication structures 
and suited leadership. Thus, the understanding of the relation between particular 
instruments as part of management control systems and banks’ risk culture consti-
tutes a second important issue. Management control research provides frameworks 
to foster this analysis. Based on previous research (e.g., Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence 
& Lorsch, 1967; Perrow, 1970; Thompson, 1967), Chenhall (2003) classifies man-
agement controls in the two broad categories of organic, less standardized and 
mechanistic, formalized management controls. Merchant and Van der Stede (2017) 
provide a more nuanced categorization by differentiating results controls (focus-
ing on the outcomes of employees’ work activities), action controls (setting deci-
sion frames within that decision makers can operate), personnel controls (ensuring 
a good fit between the recruited employees and the job requirements) and cultural 
controls (norms, traditions and organizational values). Malmi and Brown (2008) 
separate five types of management controls: Planning controls are dedicated to the 
definition of targets of different business units and their coordination. Cybernetic 
controls constitute activities that ensure goal achievement through for example 
budgets and performance measures. Reward and compensation controls comprise 
incentive systems to motivate employees to behave in accordance with organiza-
tional goals. Administrative goals consist of organizational structures, procedures 
and routines. Cultural controls focus on the application of organizational norms and 
values to influence employees’ behavior.
Banks’ risk culture is part of cultural controls and as such, forms part of organic, 
less standardized management controls. In contrast, those aspects that are discussed 
in literature as important to reach a risk culture that fits the business model form 
part of other management controls, like results/rewards and compensation controls. 
The systematic literature review builds on this observation and serves to identify 
these aspects discussed to date and their relation to risk culture. To assure a struc-
tured discussion of the articles assigned to this category, we apply the framework 
designed by Merchant and Van der Stede (2017), that provides the subcategories 
cultural, action, personnel and results controls. In the first subcategory, cultural con-
trols, we present articles that for example deal with different manifestations of risk 
culture as one form of cultural controls, that emphasize ethical aspects as another 
part of cultural controls or that indicate an impact of national culture in this con-
text. Further three subcategories deal with articles which provide insights regarding 
one of the relations between banks’ risk culture and action, personnel and results 
controls. Additionally, we identified articles which deal with more comprehensive 
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frameworks related to banks’ risk culture comprising issues considering all kinds of 
management controls. These articles are discussed in one further subcategory.
Third, management control systems are not static, but they develop over time, 
the same holds for banks’ risk culture and its embeddedness in banks’ overall man-
agement control systems. This observation leads to a third important issue which is 
related to the nature of the change and the changeability of risk culture in banks and 
its relation to management controls.
3  Method
To get a comprehensive overview of the recent developments in risk culture research 
we performed a systematic literature review (Tranfield et  al., 2003). The previous 
discussion on risk culture in Sect.  2 indicates, that risk culture, as an immaterial, 
organizational and social phenomenon, is difficult to delimit, which complicates the 
design of a systematic literature review, as many aspects can affect it, which in turn 
become important for management control systems to manage it. In order to do jus-
tice to this problem and the continuous progress of research in this rapidly growing 
field, we have conducted multi-phase research. The starting point here was a broad 
view on the topic.
As adequate risk culture is reflected in risk taking behavior that fits to the selected 
business model, in the first phase we focused on both, articles that explicitly cover 
the topic banks’ risk culture and papers that deal with risk taking in banks. However, 
with respect to the latter topic we concentrated on papers that are related to qualita-
tive regulation, i.e. aspects of quantitative regulation like proper risk measurement 
tools, capital requirements, credit regulation regimes and similar aspects were not 
considered. In order to achieve a broad perspective on the topic, in this first phase 
we included peer reviewed articles from two different sources. Furthermore, as we 
deemed risk culture as a more recent concept in the area of bank regulation, we 
restricted this first search phase to the time period of January 1997 to the beginning 
of November 2019.
First, we performed a comprehensive database research of articles in the Abi 
Inform Complete database (only peer reviewed articles, English language) with 
the keywords risk culture, risk climate, risk management and risk taking as part of 
the title, abstract or keywords in the articles. This search was intended to provide a 
broad overview of relevant articles across all levels of peer-reviewed journals with-
out any restrictions in terms of ranking levels. Due to the great amount of unfitting 
search results, we had to narrow, where appropriate, the thematic scope by applying 
by the database provided pre-set filters to exclude articles focusing on other research 
topics, such as for example public health. This search procedure provided in a first 
step the results illustrated in Table  1, where the first row shows the results with-
out the pre-set filters and the second row those results applying the pre-set filters, 
respectively.
However, despite the application of the pre-set filters, the received hits still con-
tained a large number of articles, which were not in the focus of the present study, 
as they did not deal with risk culture in the banking industry, but e.g. risk taking 
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related to sexual behavior or risks related to climate change. A research fellow (mas-
ter level) knowledgeable in the field of risk management scanned these articles for 
their relation to risk culture in terms of a general organizational attitude towards risk 
and its handling in banks. This procedure resulted in 95 articles, which he consid-
ered as potentially relevant.
Second, in this first phase we in parallel performed an additional in-depth search 
in several premium journals to additionally identify those articles which were not 
listed in the database or which were related to our topic but could not be identified 
via the keywords within the database. We decided to perform this step, although it 
might result in a certain bias as here we explicitly focus on highly ranked journals, 
as we consider articles in these journals to be the most impactful, whose neglect in 
an overview would result in considerable restrictions. By pursuing this double strat-
egy (database search and journal search) we try to do justice to the tension between 
breadth and depth of a literature review as mentioned by Tranfield et  al. (2003), 
which arises especially in a still young and self-defining field.
As we focus on both risk culture in banks, i.e. a finance topic, and management 
control systems, i.e. a management control topic, we selected journals from two dis-
ciplines: On the one hand, as we focus on risk culture in banks, we considered finan-
cial premier journals. We identified the following journals using journal ranking and 
bibliometric studies (e.g., García-Romero et  al., 2016; Ritzberger, 2008; Schäffer 
et  al., 2011) and a range of journal rankings compiled and updated regularly by 
Anne Will Harzing (available at: https:// harzi ng. com/ resou rces/ journ al- quali ty- 
list): Journal of Finance; Journal of Financial Economics; Journal of Banking & 
Finance; Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control; Review of Finance; Review of 
Financial Studies; Journal of Financial Intermediation; Journal of Money, Credit & 
Banking. On the other hand, as risk culture is part of banks’ management controls, 
Table 1  Results of the search in the ABI Inform Database (First search phase)
During the first search phase, we performed several searches: The first one in February 2018 covered 
literature from January 1997 to February 2018, the second considered the literature from March to 
September 2018, the third search was dedicated to papers published from October to December 2018 
and the fourth dealt with articles from the period of January to November 2019. Thus, data provided 
in Table 1 covers the sum of the hits found in all searches. Moreover, with respect to risk management 
and risk taking we focused during the first search (performed in February 2018) only on the title, as the 
search within abstracts and keywords yielded unreasonably high results, which were not linked to our 
topic. Thus, regarding risk management and risk taking Table 1 only contains the results of the remain-




Risk culture Risk climate Risk management Risk taking Sum
Title No filter 302 559 3508 2403 6772
With filter 161 70 216 243 690
Abstract No filter 7211 5061 26,906 864 40,042
With filter 935 1076 1802 322 4135
Keywords No filter 1377 1866 1283 624 5150
With filter 791 68 399 66 1324
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we additionally searched within premier journals that cover management control 
research. We selected Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting 
Research, The Accounting Review, Contemporary Accounting Research, Manage-
ment Accounting Research and Accounting, Organizations and Society as premier 
accounting journals based on Bonner et al. (2006) and Balstad and Berg (2019). The 
search, which was performed by reading the title and the abstract, in these premier 
journals lead to 310 potentially relevant articles.
The search in the journals was conducted independently by one of the two 
authors and partly by a research fellow (master level) knowledgeable in the field of 
risk management.
In the further process the authors once again read the abstracts or, if necessary, 
the complete texts of the articles so far identified in the database and the premier 
journals as potentially relevant. During this process further articles were identified 
which, in contrast to our or the research fellow’s initial judgement, did not provide 
insights directly related to risk culture as a qualitative aspect of regulation, but 1) 
focused mainly on aspects related to quantitative regulation like risk measurement 
or capital requirements, 2) covered a much broader perspective, like risk manage-
ment or risk taking in banks in general or 3) dealt with risk management in general 
independently of the industry. Therefore, further articles, which were initially con-
sidered as potentially relevant by one of the authors or the research fellow, were 
excluded from our sample after debating it with the other author. Moreover, those 
articles which focused on risk culture in the sense of the present paper were further 
analyzed whether they also contained a relation to management control systems as 
defined in the present paper. This procedure reduced our sample from initially 405 
potentially relevant articles to 37 articles. One further article was eliminated due 
to a reviewer recommendation during the revision process leading to a sample of 
36 relevant articles. To assure completeness of our sample, we hereafter executed 
a backward search, i.e. we analyzed the literature of our sample and identified 15 
additional articles that we considered in our further analysis. Finally, we retained 51 
articles in our sample.
However, as research on risk culture is conducted with growing interest and pub-
lished in a broad range of journals apart from premium journals and potentially not 
listed in the ABI Inform Complete database, we decided to execute a second search 
phase in June 2020. During this search, we did not focus on a pre-set period of time 
to additionally also cover literature, which was overlooked during the first phase as it 
was published before the pre-set time frame. We decided to make this change to the 
search framework because when we read the articles already identified we noticed 
that some older sources were indeed cited. We searched the following databases: Abi 
Inform Complete (226 hits), Business Source Premier/EconLit (111 hits), Ingenta 
(225 hits) and Science Direct (114 hits) with the search strings “risk culture AND 
bank” and “risk climate AND bank” in title, abstract or keywords. It has to be men-
tioned, that due to this more focused search strategy in terms of the search string, 
this second search provided a much lower number of initial hits, while yielding a 
number of additional articles almost comparable to the outcome of the first search 
phase. Additionally, we searched the first 200 hits of Google Scholar applying these 
search strings. The total amount of hits contained 148 duplicates. After reading the 
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abstracts and partly the papers, we identified 32 articles additionally to the previ-
ously selected papers. These articles also were subject to a backward search, which 
yielded 20 further papers. Thus, in total we identified 103 relevant articles.
The identified literature is structured along those categories that are derived in 
Sect. 2: The first category focuses on the assessment of risk culture. The second cat-
egory deals with the relation between risk culture and particular management con-
trols or packages of them. We differentiate five subcategories: The first subcategory 
contains articles dealing with more holistic aspects regarding the embeddedness of 
risk culture in overall management control packages. They mention several man-
agement controls simultaneously. The remaining four subcategories are dedicated 
to articles which focus on one of the four management control types introduced 
by Merchant and Van der Stede (2017), i.e. cultural, action, results and personnel 
controls. In the third category we elaborate on issues related to the development of 
banks’ risk culture over time.
Table 2 provides an overview of the papers, the applied method and the sample, 
where applicable. Table 3 constitutes the concept matrix resulting from categorizing 
the content of the identified articles (Webster & Watson, 2002).
4  Results
4.1  Assessment of risk culture
Literature regarding the assessment of risk culture still is scarce. We identified two 
validated scales and one framework. Sheedy et al. (2017) present a scale of 16 items 
(structured along four factors) to measure the perception of risk culture, which they 
call risk climate. The scale comprises the following dimensions: “Valued: Staff per-
ceive that risk management is genuinely valued within the organization […] Proac-
tive: Staff perceive that (in the local business unit) risk issues and events are proac-
tively identified and addressed […] Avoidance: Staff perceive that risk issues and 
policy breaches are ignored, downplayed or excused in the organization […] Man-
ager: Staff perceive that their (local) manager is an effective role model for desirable 
risk management behaviours” (Sheedy, 2016, p. 6). Sheedy (2016) uses this scale 
to investigate the relation between risk climate and banks’ size. Sheedy and Grif-
fin (2018) apply this scale to analyze staff’s perception of risk culture and its rela-
tion with risk structures and risk behavior, i.e. in this recent publication, they switch 
from their previous term risk climate to risk culture. The data (30,126 responses 
by staff of banks in Australia and Canada in the period of 2014 to 2015) provides 
evidence for varying perceptions with regard to the quality of risk culture between 
business units and business lines and a rather complex relation between risk struc-
tures, risk culture and risk behavior.
Muñiz et al. (2020) present another 18-item scale to assess risk culture in banks 
considering the four building blocks according to the FSB (tone from the top, 
accountability, effective communication and challenges, incentives), i.e. they more 
closely follow regulators’ specifications, but also focus on staff’s perceptions.
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Banks’ risk culture and management control systems: A systematic…
Thakor (2016) transfers the Competing Value Framework to banks’ credit cul-
ture to create an instrument, which allows banks to assess their culture. The origi-
nal framework differentiates the four corporate culture orientations compete, create, 
control and collaborate, which are related to different leader styles, value drivers 
and basic assumptions about the means to effectively achieve goals (Quinn & Rohr-
baugh, 1983). Thakor (2016) adapts this framework to assess credit culture and dif-
ferentiates competitive individual culture (compete), product-innovation-focused 
culture (create), risk-minimization-focused culture (control) and partnership cul-
ture (collaborate). Banks act differently in the context of credit risk management 
depending on the particular culture type. In contrast to the two previously mentioned 
assessment instruments, Thakor (2016) does not provide a validated scale, but rather 
points to a more subjective self-assessment process.
4.2  Relation between risk culture and management controls
4.2.1  Embeddedness of risk culture in overall management control packages
On a conceptually basis, several scholars develop and discuss comprehensive frame-
works to foster banks’ risk culture, which highlight learning from failure, organi-
zational resilience and corporate governance as more general aspects, but also 
individual responsibility and supervision (which are related to action controls), 
remuneration systems (which constitute results controls) as well as training, recruit-
ment and knowledgeable leaders (which are components of personnel controls) 
(Bott & Milkau, 2018; Cordery, 2007; Drennan, 2004; Drummond, 2002; Gontarek, 
2016; Jackson, 2015; McConnell, 2013; Srivastav & Hagendorff, 2016; Wood & 
Lewis, 2018). Young (2011) adds the concept of high-reliability organizations to the 
discussion. They offer the possibility to establish more stable banks in terms of risk 
taking due to high levels of resilience and responsiveness, exemplary leadership and 
customer-centric objectives. Fritz-Morgenthal et al. (2016) and Yusuf et al. (2020) 
add to this further insights regarding the positive effects of an adequate risk culture 
on risk management.
These concepts promote a holistic perspective on risk culture or as Stulz (2008, p. 
47) stresses: “If risk is everybody’s business, it is harder for major risks to go unde-
tected and unmanaged.” This view underpins the importance not only of individual 
management controls in the context of risk culture, but also and especially of the 
importance of embedding risk culture in an overarching concept for entire manage-
ment control systems. The following articles add to this perspective further insights.
Cordery (2007, p. 64) elaborates on the severe foreign exchange loss announced 
by the National Australian Bank in January 2004 and identifies problems applying 
“behavioural controls, such as supervision and security restrictions, attitudinal con-
trols affecting hiring procedures and corporate cultural development, and account-
ability controls consisting of budgets, targets, incentives and reporting” as instru-
ments to attenuate dysfunctional behavior in this context. According to the author, 
particularly, incentive systems motivated dealers to break trading limits and to 
work around established control systems. Moreover, dealers did not exhibit proper 
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attitudes to behave in an ethical way. Although the bank applied codes of conduct 
signed by each employee, they were not trained to fill this declaration of intent with 
life and there was no exchange between the board members to develop systems 
implementing the declaration in daily business. Furthermore, due to a focus on profit 
only good news was passed to the top management. Additionally, board members 
did not have a full understanding of the business model and particularly the risk 
underlying it. Dellaportas et al. (2007) discuss the same case study, i.e. the National 
Australian Bank. They also highlight detrimental effects of incentive systems. More-
over, they stress that management followed a profit-oriented perspective, neglecting 
ethical aspects and that the organization operated in a bureaucratic manner, where 
top management focused on processes, documentation and procedure manuals 
instead of really understanding the issues. This points to dysfunctional communica-
tion structures. Furthermore, management also did not take on responsibility, per-
sonal and professional attacks were observed towards market risk and internal audit 
staff by traders and traders were selected only according to their ability to make 
profits irrespectively of how they achieved them.
Barings Bank is another prominent example of failing to embed a proper risk 
culture in an overarching set of management controls (Stonham, 1996a, 1996b). 
Drennan (2004) particularly points to missing personnel and action controls in this 
context. The author provides evidence that the recruitment of extreme risk takers in 
reaction to the de-regulation of the UK financial services market and dysfunctional 
supervision processes allowed Nick Leeson, a trader on the Singapore International 
Monetary Exchange (SIMEX), to continue fraudulent activities. He was not only 
Chief Trader but also Head of Settlements. Moreover, his local supervisor did not 
monitor him and his manager in London left the monitoring to the local supervisor. 
Drummond (2002) adds to the discussion that Leeson’s supervisors were not knowl-
edgeable enough to supervise his activities and operated in a state of “groupthink”. 
Stein (2000) discusses the case of Barings Bank from a psychoanalytical point of 
view. He also identifies the deregulation of the UK banking sector as one major fac-
tor that enhanced the dysfunctional structures, which allowed Leeson to act without 
proper supervision.
Lehman Brothers constitutes a third example of failure, which is explicitly dis-
cussed in extant literature. Based on Schein’s (2010) organizational culture frame-
work Ganon et al. (2017) identify the behavior of Richard Fulder, the final CEO of 
Lehman Brothers, and the culture installed by him as major drivers for the bank’s 
collapse, i.e. in this context the authors particularly stress the absence of proper per-
sonnel and cultural controls.
Literature dealing with the reasons behind the last financial crisis as well points 
to missing relations between risk culture and other management controls. Jackson 
(2015) highlights (among other aspects) inadequate incentives, poor information 
flows, poor leadership and no clear accountability as reasons for inadequate risk 
taking resulting in the financial crisis. Furlong et al. (2017) argue that misconduct, 
which also led to the financial crisis in 2007/2008, is rooted in poor judgements 
resulting from underdeveloped character dimensions and organizational culture 
which does not mitigate them. Thus, the authors focus on both personnel and cul-
tural controls. They explicitly stress that poor conduct not only is an ethical or moral 
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issue. This perspective has the advantage that “[v]iewing misconduct as a judgement 
issue instead of a moral issue engages audiences who want to improve decision-
making but without the judging that is typically associated with moral agendas. Dis-
cussions can be had more dispassionately and rationally, and the audience does not 
feel themselves under attack” (Furlong et al., 2017, p. 208). The authors develop a 
Leader Character Framework that comprises those characteristics relevant for lead-
ers to behave adequately. Hashagen et al. (2009) present a study with more than 400 
participants (senior managers involved in risk management of banks) carried out by 
KPMG and the Economist Intelligence Unit. The participants were asked to name 
the weaknesses in risk management in banks that fostered the recent financial crisis 
and the measures that banks take to prevent such a crisis from occurring again. The 
participants stress the importance of risk culture and highlight the relevance of sen-
ior managers’ leadership to implement a prudent risk culture, i.e. 77% of the partici-
pants stress tone from the top as one important issue to develop an appropriate risk 
culture. Also, proper remuneration and a strengthening of risk professionals’ role is 
mentioned. However, as many as 45% of the banks surveyed also admit that their 
management boards do not have sufficient knowledge about risks.
4.2.2  Risk culture and cultural controls
The present section is dedicated to the relation between risk culture and banks’ over-
arching cultural controls. Rad (2016) provides a particular perspective on this issue. 
The author focuses on the interplay between risk management and management con-
trol systems. Thus, he does not refer to risk culture, but rather to a concept which 
is related to it. However, by drawing on Simons’ Levers of Control Framework to 
analyze this relation in two case studies, he identifies belief systems to be of high 
relevance in this context. Thus, although he does not focus on risk culture in par-
ticular, his analysis stresses the importance of cultural components, when analyzing 
the relation between risk management and management controls. Similarly, Stulz 
(2016) highlights culture as an important factor to mitigate the limitations of risk 
management.
While risk culture as such is by definition one component of cultural controls, 
it is also related to other aspects linked to this control type. One important aspect 
in this context are ethical issues. For example, Lui (2015) investigates five British 
banks and finds evidence that these banks have undergone a transformation from 
a customer-driven culture to a sales-oriented culture, which resulted in a greedy, 
reckless and dishonest behavior. Llewellyn (2014) discusses detrimental effects of 
banks’ culture in the context of the last financial crisis. The author does not explic-
itly state risk culture, but rather refers to banks’ culture in general and their effect 
on consumers. Nevertheless, it is clear from this discussion that risks relating to 
financial products must be clearly recognizable to customers in order to maintain 
a lasting basis of trust. In addition, he sees the establishment of cooperative banks 
as an opportunity to establish prudent risk behavior. Consequently, ethical behavior 
in terms of consumer-oriented and sustainable decision making can be related to 
prudent risk taking, which in turn is related to an adequate risk culture that mitigates 
systemic collapses of financial systems. Accordingly, Minto (2016) discusses the 
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specific values of cooperative banks as reasons for these banks to cope much better 
with the financial crisis in 2007/2008 than commercial banks. The author specifi-
cally highlights trust and reciprocity, solidarity, mutualism, proximity and “relation-
ship banking” via local presence, heterogeneity through member ownership as well 
as social commitment and the “cooperative spirit”. In their conceptual paper, also 
Awrey et  al. (2013) debate how to achieve a more ethical culture in the financial 
service industry. According to them, especially process-oriented regulation “backed 
by a credible threat of both public enforcement and reputational sanctions” (Awrey 
et  al., 2013, p. 191) can help to establish a more ethical organizational culture in 
banks by reshaping individual ethical choices. Thus, they argue for stronger regula-
tion and societal sanctioning via reputational losses in case of unethical behavior. 
Complementary to this discussion, Fichter (2018) elaborates on how ethical issues 
are solved in the daily decision processes within the financial industry and pro-
vides several suggestions for how financial institutions can translate formal ethical 
standards into decision making practice. The author stresses challenging authority, 
creating opportunities for discourse, valuing positive emotion or making time for 
reflection. Overall, this literature stresses the link between prudent risk raking, (risk) 
culture and ethical decision making. Thus, for a risk culture to be effective in terms 
of the overall financial system and to help to prevent systemic collapses, it must be 
embedded in an overarching cultural context of the bank that follows clear ethical 
standards.
Another component of cultural controls is the organizational handling of failure. 
In this context, Gendron et al. (2016) add to the discussion a perspective on stabiliz-
ing processes, which restore risk management credibility after failures and thereby 
inhibit a fundamental change in approaching risk management in banks. The authors 
find that failure of risk management is attributed to external factors like implemen-
tation failures rather than to failures within the core ideas behind the implemented 
instruments. Thus, a particular culture of handling failure can affect or inhibit the 
development of risk culture, in terms of how to manage risks reasonably, into an 
appropriate direction.
Other scholars focus more on the antecedents and components of risk culture. 
They particularly discuss the relation between values, norms and risk culture. Lo 
(2016) mention different sources of such values. They can be derived top-down 
(through leadership and authority) and bottom-up (merging form individual behav-
ior) and they are influenced by incentives and environmental factors. By applying 
Schein’s model of organizational culture Kane (2016) identifies particular norms 
in financial institutions and central banks, which foster destructive risk taking. 
The author argues for a fundamental change of norms within this industry, as the 
implementation of mechanisms just to constrain the resulting behavior will not 
effectively mitigate it. In line with this argumentation, Cohn et al. (2017) expected 
that professional norms in the financial industry in combination with the salience 
of the staff’s professional identity foster risk taking. However, in an experimental 
setting with 128 employees of a large, international bank they find evidence that 
participants took fewer risks. The authors conclude that their results “contradict the 
conventional thinking that the professional norms in the banking industry make the 
employees in that industry less risk averse” (Cohn et al., 2017, p. 3803). However, 
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this finding has to be put in a broader perspective. The identification of an adequate 
risk culture for a particular bank does not mean that the bank has to become risk 
averse, but instead the risk culture has to fit to the bank’s business model and to 
induce in this sense prudent risk taking. In this context, further findings by Cohn 
et  al. (2014) are more informative, as the authors find evidence, that the salience 
of bankers’ professional identity fosters their dishonest behavior, which points to a 
fundamental problem when establishing an adequate risk culture, as according to the 
previous discussion such a culture depends on transparent, responsible and honest 
behavior.
Further scholars consider different manifestations of risk culture to be the con-
densate of the mentioned values and norms: In order to analyze, whether the grow-
ing and in literature criticized focus on quantitative risk management is inevitable, 
Mikes (2009) discusses two different risk cultures. Mikes (2011) further elaborates 
on these different manifestations and investigates the perspectives on risk measure-
ment within two case studies and 53 further interviews with risk management staff 
in the period of 2001  to  2010. Some organizations have a culture of quantitative 
enthusiasm, i.e. they believe in the power of risk measurement, while others follow 
a culture of quantitative skepticism, which results in risk envisionment by provid-
ing alternative future scenarios. The two cultures lead to different behavior of risk 
officers and their boundary work. A culture of quantitative enthusiasm fosters risk 
control through the implementation of measurement instruments and the empha-
sis of independent and scientific risk control. In contrast, in a culture of calcula-
tive skepticism, “controllers in this camp lacked the analytical mystique wielded by 
those with quantitative enthusiasm and they appeared to have deliberately left the 
boundaries between themselves and the rest of the organization blurred and porous 
in order to influence decision makers in the business lines” (Mikes, 2011, p. 241). 
Lim et al. (2017) add to this further evidence. Based on qualitative data, they argue 
that banks are confronted with “a core paradox of market versus regulatory demands 
and an accompanying variety of performance, learning and belonging paradoxes” 
(Lim et al., 2017, p. 75), which are so far resolved by inappropriate measures, as a 
power imbalance between front and back office remains. The authors suggest that 
this problem only can be resolved if risk management is less defined by normative, 
standard based rules but considers a behavioral dimension. Thus, they argue for a 
shift from quantitative enthusiasm to quantitative skepticism. Stulz (2015) also con-
trasts a behavioral perspective with a statistical, calculative orientation in risk man-
agement. The author states that “it’s important to keep in mind that companies in 
the financial industry differ considerably from non-financial firms in the extent to 
which employees are empowered to make decisions that affect risk” (Stulz, 2015, 
p. 16) and stresses adequate risk culture as a way to increase flexibility which is 
mitigated by statistical risk management. Based on the notion that the application of 
quantitative models increases the perception of decreasing uncertainty and increas-
ing manageability of risk, LaBriola (2019) analyzes a possible positive relation 
between the relative level (1) of securities and (2) of trading securities and levels 
of leverage. The data (bank-years for large U.S. commercial banks over the period 
of 1996 to 2016) supports the second hypothesis, whereas it does not lend any sup-
port to the first one. However, the support of the second hypothesis does not indicate 
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that actually the application of quantitative models as such results in imprudent risk 
taking, as the author does not test this relation. Yet, the results point to a possi-
ble relation, which again favors calculative skepticism over quantitative enthusiasm. 
Based on the Competing Value Framework, which comprises the four corporate cul-
ture dimensions compete, create, control and collaborate (cf. Sect. 4.1) developed by 
Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983), Nguyen et al. (2019) add to these results by differen-
tiating two foci of risk culture: compete and create cultures are related to a growth 
focus, while collaborate and control cultures pertain a safety focus. The authors find 
that banks following the earlier focus incur greater loan losses than banks applying 
the later focus. In sum, besides categorizing risk culture into different categories 
the mentioned authors also evaluate the identified types. Risk cultures stressing on 
collaboration, trust, solidarity and a healthy critical distance to mathematical risk 
management approaches seem to be favored over competitive, aggressive and quan-
titatively enthusiastic cultures, as the former result in more resilient banks.
Additionally, scholars find evidence that the conceptualization of an adequate risk 
culture might vary between organizational units within one single bank depending 
on the units’ tasks: Based on semi-structured interviews Wahlström (2009) finds dif-
ferences with respect to the acceptance of the approaches of risk measurement by 
Basel II between the operational staff and staff working with risk measurement. The 
author explains this observation with differences in the frames of reference, which 
can be interpreted as parts of the risk culture prevailing within each unit. While such 
differences can result in conflicts, Bruce (2014) provides evidence that different per-
spectives on risk culture within one bank also can be advantageous. The author pre-
sents four worldviews, which can be interpreted as antecedents of risk culture and 
which result from a combination between grid and group: Grid refers to the extent to 
which the social context expects people to behave in a particular way dependent on 
their role, i.e. the military is a high grid-context, as the hierarchical position clearly 
determines how a person can act. In contrast, “[g]roup measures both how strongly 
an individual associates with the organization or collective, and how strongly the 
organization or collective exerts influence over the individual” (Bruce, 2014, p. 
552). Each dimension can have two levels (high and low). Therefore, the combina-
tion of the dimensions results in four worldviews, which in turn guide human behav-
ior differently and, thus, also the interpretation of the reasons behind the recent 
financial crisis. Based on this analysis, the author argues that diversity and the joint 
incorporation of different worldviews can improve risk management. Consequently, 
the implementation of an adequate risk culture that fits the selected business model 
also comprises the acceptance of different worldviews.
National culture constitutes another source of norm-based influence. It forms part 
of cultural controls, but it is less changeable by firms as such. It rather constitutes a 
pre-set condition, in which other cultural controls are embedded. Scholars actually 
find evidence that it exerts an important impact on banks’ risk taking. For example, 
based on a sample of 65 to 70 countries in the period of 2000  to  2006, Kanaga-
retnam et al. (2014) find lower risk taking in banks in low individualism and high 
uncertainty avoidance cultures. Similarly, in a sample of 75 countries Ashraf et al. 
(2016) observe that cultures characterized by high individualism and low uncer-
tainty avoidance (as well as low power distance) foster risk taking in banks. Findings 
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by Mihet (2013) support this evidence regarding a positive relation between high 
individualism and risk taking. Mourouzidou-Damtsa et  al. (2019) as well observe 
this relation, but not for globally operating banks. In contrast, in a global sample of 
467 commercial listed banks from 56 countries, Illiashenko and Laidroo (2020) find 
evidence of a negative relation between individualism and banks’ risk taking. The 
authors explain this observation by the cushioning hypothesis, i.e. decision makers 
in collectivist cultures receive more support if they make a mistake and are therefore 
more willing to take risks. Kanagaretnam et  al. (2019) add to these observations 
evidence of a relation between societal trust and banks’ risk taking: Banks located 
in high-trust countries exhibit lower levels of risk taking than banks located in low-
trust countries. The authors further provide first evidence that this attenuating effect 
is channeled via greater accounting transparency, higher scores in social CSR and 
lower CEO equity incentive compensation, i.e. in the study societal trust is related 
to these aspects in the mentioned direction and they attenuate imprudent risk taking. 
In sum, these results suggest that the basic attitudes towards risk behavior within a 
national culture have an important impact on banks’ risk taking and thus supplement 
and influence the risk culture of a particular bank.
Finally, also different stakeholders can exert an impact on risk culture, because 
they can have more or less influence depending on their position of power by com-
municating corresponding expectations and setting certain regulatory standards. 
Also in this context only some scholars explicitly discuss risk culture, while others 
rather provide indirect insights with respect to risk culture, as they focus on risk tak-
ing. However, as risk taking also is an expression of the prevailing risk culture and 
the investigated stakeholders have the power to set norms and values and thereby to 
transport their worldview into the banks and to influence the manifestation of cul-
tural controls, we consider also this part of literature as insightful for the present 
topic. Several scholars focus on the impact of regulators on risk culture as particu-
larly powerful stakeholders (Cohen, 2015; Mongiardino & Plath, 2010; Rattaggi, 
2017; Walter & Narring, 2020). For example, Schnatterly et al. (2019) investigate 
the implications of the selection of one of three possible regulators by the initial 
board of directors within new U.S. banks for the banks’ future risk taking. Their 
results point to a joint effect of board independence and the selected regulator on the 
banks’ risk. The analysis is based on a sample of 140 new banks from the population 
of 1,367 U.S. banks chartered between 1992 and 1998. Carretta et al. (2017) observe 
differences between national supervisors’ conceptualization of risk culture as well 
as their substantial distance to the ECB’s risk culture in the period of 1999 to 2012. 
These differences complicate the development of an adequate risk culture within 
European banks, particularly the ones that operate internationally, because they 
are confronted with different requirements. Sinha and Arena (2018) investigate the 
viewpoints of regulators as well as normalizers, consultants, and implementers on 
risk culture. Their sample consists of 20 interviews and 295 documents. They find 
two distinct interpretations. While the first interpretation concentrates on the con-
trol of risk culture via verification, the second interpretation focuses on the control 
of risk culture through internal audits and the empowerment of employees through 
training. Regulators and implementers promote the first interpretation, while con-
sultants and normalizers foster the second one. In order to fully satisfy the different 
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stakeholders’ demands, banks have to set up a process, which discloses these view-
points and integrates them into a comprehensive approach related to the manage-
ment of risk culture.
Bank founders and owners constitute another important group of stakeholders 
which exerts an impact on banks’ risk culture. Almandoz (2014) finds that bank 
founders’ institutional logic influences those banks’ risk taking, at least in banks 
with larger founder teams. Based on archival data from 225 local banks founded 
between 2006 and 2009 and interviews with 73 bank founders, he observes that 
banks, whose founder team adheres to a financial logic, define the bank as an invest-
ment and profit-maximization vehicle and increasingly use risky deposit instru-
ments. In contrast, the dominance of a community logic stresses the relevance of 
the bank to meet community needs and leads to a lower utilization of such instru-
ments. According to Saunders et al. (1990) stockholder held banks exhibit a higher 
level of risk taking than managerial controlled banks. Sullivan and Spong (2007) 
observe that hired managers’ stock ownership increases risk taking. Kwan (2004) 
finds moderate evidence of a lower level of risk taking in publicly held banks than 
in private owned banks. Iannotta et al. (2007) as well find differences regarding risk 
taking across banks with different ownership structures. The findings in a sample of 
European banks by Barry et al. (2011) indicate that difference in risk taking induced 
by different owners rather occurs in privately owned banks than in publicly held 
banks. Additionally, applying a panel of commercial banks from 17 European coun-
tries containing 1,237 banks with ownership information within the period of 1998 
to 2011 Barry et al. (2019) observe an effect of the acquirer type on the level of risk 
(and profitability). Institutional investors, the state or non-financial companies lead 
to increasing risk, while profitability remains the same. In contrast, banks and fami-
lies as acquirer have no significant effect on risk.
4.2.3  Risk culture and action controls
There is very little literature on the link between risk culture and action controls. 
Apart from the literature discussed in Sect. 4.2.1, which, among other aspects, men-
tions the importance of supervision and accountability, we identified one article, 
which deals indepth with one particular aspect related to action controls. Again, this 
article discusses the effect on risk taking and thus only indirectly provides evidence 
regarding risk culture.
In a conceptual paper applying the theoretical lens of principal-agent theory, i.e. 
aspects like moral hazard, conflict of interest and adverse selection, Roy (2008) 
investigates the impact of different organizational structures (functional versus divi-
sional hierarchy) on banks’ risk taking. According to the author, functional hierar-
chy inhibits the application of soft information and the transfer of information in 
time to the relevant place within the organization, which for example can mitigate 
the proper examination of a loan. In contrast, divisional hierarchies foster the indi-
vidualization of risk choices without considering the whole risk portfolio of the 
bank. However, the author concludes that after considering the pros and cons of 
both structures, the divisional structure is superior to the functional one in terms of 
fostering an adequate risk taking behavior. As previously mentioned, this paper does 
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not deal explicitly with risk culture. However, it provides evidence of how organiza-
tional structure can shape risk taking. Through this framing process, organizational 
structure on the one hand can inhibit or foster risk taking which is in line with a par-
ticular risk culture, and thereby influence risk culture’s impact. On the other hand, it 
also can shape risk culture as such as it fosters the acceptance of particular risk tak-
ing as inevitable (within the given structures), which is translated into organizational 
believes about how risk taking should take place.
4.2.4  Risk culture and results controls
A very broad stream of literature discusses incentive systems, i.e. results controls, 
as they focus decision makers’ attention towards certain aspects and thereby directly 
influence their risk taking. Thus, many scholars in this context rather discuss risk 
taking than risk culture. However, we also consider this literature as valuable for the 
present research focus because it illustrates, how certain incentive systems as mani-
festation of a particular risk culture can induce certain risk taking. Thereby they can 
further stabilize this risk taking behavior and strengthen underlying norms related to 
risk behavior, i.e. risk culture. The identified literature discusses aspects both on the 
top and on the operational level. Moreover, scholars apply both mathematical and 
empirical methodologies in this research field.
Two articles provide evidence regarding normative results with respect to vari-
able compensation at the top-management level. They mathematically analyze pos-
sibilities to influence the way of how decision makers evaluate and take risks and 
to curb a culture of excessive risk taking by aligning investor interests and execu-
tive interests via compensation. By applying a principal agent-based methodology, 
John et al. (2000) explore the possibility to influence bank risk taking through the 
incorporation of incentive features of top-management compensation in the FDIC 
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) insurance premium scheme. Such schemes 
should induce bank owners to design optimal incentive schemes for top manag-
ers. Additionally, based on the results of their principal agent-model, Bolton et al. 
(2015) suggest to mitigate excessive risk taking by relating compensation to stock 
prices and credit default swaps.
However, while the previously mentioned research based on mathematical mod-
elling identifies a positive relation between the alignment of investors’ and top man-
agers’ interests via variable compensation components, empirical evidence and 
conceptual discussion is somewhat contrary. Zalewska (2016, p. 331) questions the 
suitability of transferring insights from literature on principal-agent conflicts in gen-
eral, as “in the case of the banking sector, remuneration may be a source of type 
III agency conflict, i.e., the conflict between shareholders and other stakeholders, 
and as such cannot be left in the hands of shareholders or even financial institu-
tion-related stakeholders (e.g., employees)“. Thus, the author argues that regulators 
should also be actively involved in setting the remuneration to achieve a compre-
hensive approach in regulation and to calibrate incentives in a way that fits to the 
desired risk level and thereby fosters an adequate risk culture. Accordingly, Fahlen-
brach and Stulz (2011) find, based on a sample of 95 banks extracted from Stand-
ard and Poor’s Execucomp database, no evidence that a better alignment of CEOs’ 
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compensation with shareholders’ interests leads to a better performance of banks 
during the last crisis. They rather argue that banks following this path even might 
have performed worse with respect to stock returns and accounting return on equity. 
Thus, their findings do not indicate any positive impact of compensation schemes 
related to investor interests on prudent risk taking leading to superior performance. 
Bebchuk et al. (2010) analyze the effects of compensation structures in Bear Stearns 
and Lehman Brothers in the period of 2000 to 2008 and argue for a detrimental 
effect of short-term variable compensation components. Based on the analysis of 
14 financial institutes in the period of 2000 to 2008, Bhagat and Bolton (2014) also 
find negative impacts of executive compensation programs and suggest Restricted 
Equity, i.e. executive compensation that contains restricted stock and stock options, 
which can be sold only after a certain period of time after leaving the firm. Bha-
gat et al. (2014) pick up this discussion and elaborate further on this concept. Also, 
Gande and Kalpathy (2017) observe detrimental effects of CEO equity incentives, as 
they foster solvency problems related to risk taking behavior. Their results are based 
on a sample of 69 financial firms in the period of 2007 to 2010. These findings are 
further corroborated by the results of Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011), who iden-
tify in a sample of 172 bank acquisitions between 1993 and 2007 a positive relation 
between variable incentives and risky mergers undertaken by bank CEOs. Moreover, 
also other compensation components can have a detrimental impact: Brown et  al. 
(2015) examine the effect of 533 severance contracts for financial service firms in 
the period of 1997 to 2007 and find a positive relation between the amount stated in 
these contracts and risk taking.
Further scholars observe a relation between option-based compensation and a 
detrimental degree of risk taking, particular in the run-up of the last financial crisis: 
By investigating a sample during the period of 1992 to 2000 with 591 bank-CEO-
year observations Chen et al. (2006) find a positive relation between the application 
of option-based compensation and the risk taking of commercial banks. A similar 
result is observed by Minhat and Abdullah (2016), who apply a balanced panel of 
240 bank-year-observations in the period of 2005 to 2008. Fortin et  al. (2010) as 
well identify positive effects of stock options on banks’ risk taking by investigating 
83 large U.S. bank holding companies in the period of 2005 to 2006.
In sum, this stream of literature stresses negative effects of particularly option-
based and other variable incentives on prudent risk taking. These incentive systems 
foster a culture of excessive risk taking, which is detrimental to the banks’ perfor-
mance and thus does not fit to any viable business model, be it rather risk averse 
or risk seeking. Thus, they transport a kind of risk culture into the banks which is 
detrimental and not in the sense of regulation which attaches great importance to 
minimizing unnecessary risks (e.g., FSB, 2014).
Yet, Iqbal and Vähämaa (2019) find ambiguous evidence for a clear relation 
between incentive systems and banks’ systemic risk. Data obtained from 71 large 
U.S. financial institutions on CEO and CFO compensation over the period of 2005 to 
2010 with 332 firm-year observations points to a negative relation between systemic 
risk and the sensitivities of CEO and CFO compensation to stock return volatility. 
In contrast, the data also provides evidence that “financial institutions with greater 
managerial risk-taking incentives were associated with significantly higher levels of 
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systemic risk during the peak of the financial crisis in 2008” (Iqbal & Vähämaa, 
2019, p. 1229). Acrey et al. (2011) as well do not find a clear indication for detri-
mental effects of options and bonuses. In their study, based on a sample of the larg-
est U.S. banks in the period of 2004 to 2008 (dependent on the analysis the sample 
size varies between 35 and 85), these compensation components are either insignifi-
cantly related to risk variables or exhibit a negative correlation with them. Moreo-
ver, Houston and James (1995) do not find evidence that compensation is structured 
in a way that fosters more risk taking in banks than in other industries within a sam-
ple from 1980 to 1990. Applying a sample of bank-years for large U.S. commercial 
banks over the period of 1996 to 2016 LaBriola (2019) tests the relation between the 
sensitivity of compensation of CEOs to gains in the bank’s stock price and levels of 
leverage but does not find any significant effect. Moreover, Guo et al. (2015) observe 
a positive relation between short- and long-term variable compensation components 
and particular risk measures, i.e. a positive relation between these incentives and 
risk taking, but also a negative relation between the proportion of variable incen-
tives and the likelihood of a bank to fail (data was taken form 134 bank holding 
companies during the period of 1992 to 2008). According to Cheng et  al. (2015) 
variable pay does not lead to increased risk taking but high-risk jobs, like activi-
ties in the banking sector, require firms to provide employees with high-powered, 
variable payment to recruit suitable staff: “Career rewards for working at high-risk 
firms are turbulent, and so risk and pay are correlated not because pay causes risk 
but because risk-averse managers require pay to keep them working at firms with 
higher risk. According to this view, the management teams of Bear Stearns, Lehman 
Brothers, Countrywide, and AIG were paid more than management at other firms as 
the strategies demanded by shareholders were fundamentally riskier” (Cheng et al., 
2015, p. 842).
This stream of research puts the previously mentioned findings into a broader 
perspective and points to the important differentiation between risk taking as such 
and risk culture. Although, particular kinds of incentive systems induce a higher 
propensity to take risks, this risk seeking behavior might not be detrimental in all 
instances. An adequate risk culture does not necessarily have to be risk-averse. It 
only has to match the level of risk that a bank wants to and, above all, can hold (e.g., 
FSB, 2014). Consequently, regulators’ increased focus on adequate incentives after 
the last financial crisis seems to be warranted, but the relation between compen-
sation and risk behavior on the higher organizational levels is more complex than 
expected, as the following discussion also shows.
Several articles provide evidence that the relation between incentives and risk 
taking is further affected by various factors. Based on a principal-agent model Kolm 
et  al. (2016) derive a complex relation between regulation, CEO compensation 
and active boards. According to their model in the presence of active boards “[c]
ompensation regulation prevents overinvestment in strategies that increase risk, but 
it is ineffective in preventing underinvestment in strategies that reduce risk” (Kolm 
et al., 2016, p. 1901). Consequently, these results indicate that regulation targeting 
risk taking by regulating compensation only has limited effect. Cerasi and Olivi-
ero (2015) further qualify these results. Based on a mathematical model which is 
tested with an empirical sample of 116 banks (data taken in the period of 2007 to 
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2008), they find that “greater sensitivity of CEOs’ equity portfolios to stock prices 
and volatility is associated with poorer performance and greater risk at the banks 
where shareholder control is weaker and in countries with explicit deposit insur-
ance” (Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015, p. 242). Consequently, the detrimental impact of 
particular compensation components on risk taking is affected by further situational 
factors. Accordingly, it can also be assumed that the strength with which incentive 
systems transport a certain risk culture into a bank and stabilize it is also affected 
by such factors. This conclusion is further corroborated by Bannier et al. (2013). By 
applying a principal-agent framework they find a positive relation between banks’ 
competition for talent, their incentives to offer bonuses and risk taking. The math-
ematical model by Thanassoulis (2012) leads to similar observations. Consequently, 
limited human resources can result in excess risk taking via compensation struc-
tures that are implemented to recruit the most talented staff. This result points to 
external impact factors on the design of incentive systems which could counteract 
the intended manifestation of risk culture, because the structure of these incentives 
makes a certain risk behavior appear desirable even though it deviates from a risk 
behavior that is appropriate for the bank’s business model and thus runs counter to 
an adequate risk culture. It also reveals that banks can get under strong tension while 
they try to cope simultaneously with regulatory and market requirements.
Further articles deal with the impact of variable compensation on the behavior 
of staff on the lower levels. Berger et al. (2016) show different effects of lower-level 
and higher-level managers’ shareholdings on risk taking based on a sample of 85 
U.S.-based and held failed commercial banks and a control sample of 256 U.S.-
based and held non-failed commercial banks (both over the period of the first quar-
ter of 2007 to the third quarter of 2010). In case of non-CEO executives and lower 
level managers, high shareholdings are related to higher failure risk, while CEOs’ 
high shareholdings are not related to failure risk. Consequently, the former seems 
to be induced to take higher risk by their high stakes, while the latter are not. On 
the other hand, based on experimental evidence with commercial bank loan officers 
Cole et al. (2015) find that high-powered incentives foster screening effort and prof-
itable lending decisions, while deferred compensation and limited liability mute this 
effect. These results point to the importance of a strong and timely relation between 
incentives and job-performance for staff engaged into the operational activities. In 
contrast, by applying a lab-in-the-field experiment with 269 finance professionals, 
Sheedy et  al. (2019) find evidence that fixed compensation (as compared to vari-
able compensation) and risk-focused (as compared to profit-focused) work culture 
increase the proportion of people exhibiting risk compliance. Overall, this research 
exhibits partly different effects of variable compensation on different organizational 
levels. Moreover, findings are ambiguous, e.g., Sheedy et al. (2019) observe results 
in favor of fixed compensation on the operational level, while Cole et al.’s (2015) 
findings point to a superiority of high-powered incentives. Both studies refer to dif-
ferent activities on the operation level, which might explain the different outcomes. 
However, these ambiguous observations indicate that the call for a change of com-
pensation schemes and the reduction of variable pay to implement an adequate risk 
culture and thereby more prudent risk taking in banks also on the operational level 
only is partly warranted.
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Finally, one empirical paper is rather descriptive: Based on a sample of regional 
U.S. bank CEOs between the years of 2007 and 2012, Handorf (2015) investigates 
the changes made by banks to compensation after the recent financial crisis. The 
author finds that banks have changed their compensation structures and now reward 
high capitalization and low-risk loan portfolios. Consequently, banks have reacted to 
the changing requirements and adapt their compensation schemes accordingly. The 
focus here is on steering incentives in the direction of risk-averse behavior, which 
also fosters a risk culture comprising risk-averse norms.
4.2.5  Risk culture and personnel controls
Articles considering the relation between risk culture and personnel controls pro-
vide particularly evidence regarding the impact of CEOs’ traits on risk taking. Thus, 
again this research stream does not directly focus on risk culture. However, as risk 
culture constitutes norms, values and general believes about appropriate risk han-
dling condensed from the individual believes and perceptions, this literature can be 
considered as valuable to understand the development of risk culture. This is all the 
more true as CEOs, due to their prominent position in companies, have a particular 
influence on the establishment of certain behavioral norms and thus also on risk 
culture, which is also stressed by the emphasis on the tone from the top in the con-
text of risk culture (FSB, 2014). Consequently, the application of personnel con-
trols, specifically the recruitment of CEOs with particular characteristics, can sig-
nificantly affect risk culture. Bushman et al. (2018) investigate the impact of CEO’s 
materialism, measured via a revealed preferences approach, on, among other things, 
banks’ risk taking, and find a positive relation with risk taking and a weaker risk 
management. Their sample consisted of 284 firms and 445 CEOs in the period of 
1992 to 2013. Based on a sample of 92 CEOs and data from 2006 to 2014, Buyl 
et al. (2019) investigate the relation between CEO narcissism, banks’ risk taking and 
their resilience to environmental conditions. The authors identify a positive relation 
between pre-crisis CEO narcissism and risk taking. This effect is fostered by stock 
options and mitigated by strong boards, i.e. boards including knowledgeable exter-
nal directors.
A gender-effect can also be observed in the literature: Results by Palvia et  al. 
(2015) indicate more conservative levels of capital in commercial banks with female 
CEOs, where the sample contains 6,729 commercial banks and an unbalanced panel 
of 22,978 bank-year observations in the period of 2007 to 2010.
Holland (2010) identifies missing knowledge regarding risks and value drivers as 
important factor determining the extent of individual bank failure during the finan-
cial crisis of 2007/2008. Similarly, in the context of the last financial crisis, Hol-
land (2019) identifies a knowledge gap between analysts and shareholders on the 
one hand and bank managers on the other hand and the problems to communicate 
the relevant knowledge as reason that the former expected more return than pos-
sible with reasonable activities. This asymmetrical distribution of knowledge was 
exploited by certain insiders in the bank to create structures that benefited them but 
passed on possible losses to others. While some banks established high risk cultures, 
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others tried to keep with their more conservative activities, but had increasingly 
problems to do so.
By applying a questionnaire filled out by 151 U.S. community banks, Eastburn 
and Sharland (2017) investigate why banks fail to recognize risk in a timely manner. 
In detail, they analyze the antecedents of risk tolerance in terms of behavioral traits 
and regulatory and performance criteria, the effect of risk tolerance on risk propen-
sity, the joint effect of risk tolerance and propensity on risk practice and the relation 
between risk practice and performance. Their findings indicate the importance to 
consider a joint effect of external factors and behavioral aspects to establish a risk 
culture that fits to the selected business model.
4.3  Development of banks’ risk culture over time
Power (2009) focusses on the general direction that a recalibration of risk culture 
should take. Based on a conceptual discussion, he criticizes the concept of risk appe-
tite as inadequate to understand and to develop a proper risk management within 
banks. According to this author, the concept of risk appetite is based on a view that 
conceptualizes banks as machines that can be controlled by defining one adequate 
amount of risk to take. In contrast, he suggests focusing rather on human behavior 
than on capital to establish an effective risk management in the future. This sugges-
tion also affects the perspective on risk culture. The FSB (2014, p. 1) stresses the 
importance that “institution’s risk culture supports adherence to the board-approved 
risk appetite”. If the concept of risk appetite is considered as inappropriate, the 
development of an adequate risk culture needs another anchor to be assessable as 
adequate.
Other scholars investigate particular recalibration processes. Palermo et  al. 
(2017) analyze, by applying a qualitative research methodology in the UK finan-
cial sector, the reconsideration of risk culture within financial institutions after the 
last financial crisis as a way to cope with organizational complexity. They concep-
tualize this recalibration processes as an answer to the pressure to redefine the ends 
of financial institutions. Further, this redefinition of ends leads to uncertainty and 
conflict about the means how to achieve theses ends. The paper demonstrates that 
the implementation of a reasonable risk culture is a complex process that contains 
reconstruction processes of different actors, which are difficult to manage. This 
discussion can be further related to the findings by McConnell (2014). The author 
investigates two cases, Deutsche Bank and Barclays, with respect to their strategic 
changes announced in 2012, which also encompass new ways of dealing with strate-
gic risks. The author identifies two different approaches in dealing with these recali-
bration processes and their outcomes, i.e. although confronted with the same exter-
nal requirements, the analyzed financial institutions have chosen very different ways 
to cope with them.
Two articles add more detailed evidence of how recalibration best can be 
achieved. Cox and Soobiah (2018) analyze the different outcomes of cultural 
changes in UK banks initiated and managed either top down or bottom up. Based 
on qualitative data derived from 30 semi-structured interviews they conclude that 
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approaches starting on the middle and grassroots level lead to better results than 
approaches from the organizational top. They argue that these findings are in sharp 
contrast to regulators’ recommendations. Liff and Wahlström (2018) observe dif-
ferent trajectories from how banks initially judge risk management to how their 
judgement develops over time dependent on their management control systems. Par-
ticularly, organizational structure and strategic alignment have an impact on the pos-
sibility to integrate risk management ideas into the overall organization.
5  Discussion
5.1  Broadening the perspective on assessing risk culture
In the following sections, we further elaborate on the identified findings and derive 
insights for business practice, research, education and regulators. In the present sec-
tion we concentrate on the need for a broader perspective on assessing risk culture. 
Section  5.2 is dedicated to the discussion regarding the insights on the relations 
between risk culture and management controls. Section  5.3 elaborates on conse-
quences drawn from the literature on the possibility to change risk culture and estab-
lishing the most appropriate risk culture. In Sect. 5.4 we integrate the major findings 
into a comprehensive model. To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to 
generate such a comprehensive perspective.
As discussed in Sect. 2, effective management of risk culture requires an appro-
priate evaluation tool so that decision makers can determine whether the prevail-
ing risk culture is adequate and in line with regulatory requirements. However, care 
must be taken not to fall into the unreflective use of number-based control systems 
criticized in the management control literature (e.g., Mikes, 2011; Power, 2009).
The identified literature provides three evaluation approaches, which constitute 
a starting point for such a management process. However, they are not yet the final 
solution for the following reasons. First, they are designed to be applied across a 
broad range of different institutes. Yet, due to its elusive character, the character-
istics of risk culture in detail within an individual bank are very specific. Second, 
regulators do not require developing a particular risk culture, but only an adequate 
risk culture fitting to the particular business model. Finally, parts of risk manage-
ment, as asked for in the scale by Sheedy et al. (2017) are also subject to regulatory 
requirements, i.e. here banks might not have any scope of action.
Banks need assessment tools that take into account the specifics of their business 
model and clearly differentiate between issues related to risk culture that are subject 
to clear regulatory requirements and aspects with more scope of action. Thus, the 
provided tools have to be tailored to the applying bank to better fit its peculiar needs. 
Moreover, in order to avoid the mentioned unreflective use, banks have to embed the 
application of such assessment systems into a broader process of regularly reviewing 
the current risk culture, setting targets to improve it and relating it to other man-
agement controls. This is similar to the design, implementation, monitoring, and 
embedding of performance measurement systems discussed in management control 
research in general (e.g., Chenhall, 2005; Chenhall et al., 2017; Kaplan & Norton, 
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1992). For example, a successful implementation of a Balanced Scorecard requires 
its development from within the company, the adaptation of the basic structure to 
the business model, e.g., through the introduction of further perspectives, and its 
embedding in an overall management process.
Additionally, to foster the possibility to assess risk culture, regulators have to 
strengthen their case regarding risk culture. On the one hand, regulators demand 
a targeted development of risk culture, but on the other hand, they emphasize its 
elusive character and the difficulties to evaluate and interpret it (e.g., FSB, 2014). 
This is of little help to foster banks’ understanding of what is expected from them 
when dealing with risk culture. Without such an understanding, the development 
of measurement tools is a difficult venture. This holds even more so, as different 
national supervisors seem to follow different conceptualizations of risk culture (Car-
retta et al., 2017). One way to clarify the prevailing concept of risk culture is the 
involvement of regulators in the process of designing instruments to measure risk 
culture. This involvement in turn fosters their understanding of practical problems 
when trying to assess and manage risk culture, which in turn can help to improve 
regulatory guidelines.
5.2  Embedding risk culture in a comprehensive set of management controls
Large parts of the identified literature indicate the importance of embedding risk 
culture into an overarching perspective regarding cultural controls. This perspec-
tive comprises aspects like ethical standards (Awrey et  al., 2013; Fichter, 2018; 
Llewellyn, 2014; Minto, 2016), organizational norms regarding the handling of fail-
ures (Gendron et  al., 2016) and the cultural context in terms of nationality (e.g., 
Ashraf et al., 2016; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014; Mihet, 2013). While regulators admit 
the importance of adequately handling failures and conforming to ethical standards 
in the context of risk culture (e.g., FSB, 2014), the impact of national culture so 
far does not play an important role in the debate. Yet, as it can exert an impact on 
the general perspective on risk taking, it also forms the ground for the development 
of norms regarding adequate risk handling. These norms, if not made explicit, can 
affect the concrete manifestation of a particular risk culture and mitigate the further 
development of this risk culture in an undetected manner. Consequently, the relation 
between banks’ risk culture and the cultural context, in which they are embedded, 
should be taken more into account by regulators.
Furthermore, articles related to cultural controls point both to different perspec-
tives regarding an adequate risk culture across banks but also across departments 
within banks. For example, Mikes (2011) differentiates a culture of quantitative 
enthusiasm from a culture of quantitative skepticism, with different views on how to 
approach the management and the handling of risks adequately. Bruce (2014) points 
to the positive effect of different worldviews on risk handling within an organiza-
tion, while Wahlström (2009) identifies potential for conflict, if such different views 
meet within one organization. These observations emphasize the importance of 
transparency between different perspectives on how risks are handled in order to 
develop a common risk culture appropriate to the business model. This underscores 
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the importance of transparency and open communication culture required by pre-
vailing regulations, which promote such disclosure (e.g., FSB, 2014).
So far, only few articles address the relation between action controls and risk cul-
ture. In line with regulation (e.g., FSB, 2014), several scholars stress accountability 
and adequate supervision as important (Cordery, 2007; Drennan, 2004; Drummond, 
2002; Jackson, 2015). However, so far the question of how exactly accountability 
can be achieved and which measures to hold staff accountable for their risk behavior 
work best to bring an adequate risk culture into an organization is still unanswered. 
Roy (2008) investigates the impact of functional versus divisional hierarchy on risk 
taking and thereby points to organizational structure as an important means to sup-
port a certain risk culture. The author’s discussion provides a starting point for fur-
ther investigations into this topic.
The area of remuneration is the most mature within the identified literature. 
Scholars provide a broad range of findings with respect to the impact of compen-
sation schemes on risk taking. As discussed in Sect.  4.3.4 these findings are also 
related to risk culture, as incentive systems are an expression of the prevailing risk 
culture on the one hand and stabilize it on the other. Large parts of particularly 
empirical research are critical with respect to the application of variable, option 
and stock-based incentives for decision makers on the top-management level (e.g., 
Bhagat & Bolton, 2014; Chen et  al., 2006; Minhat & Abdullah, 2016). Addition-
ally, other compensation components, like severance contracts, are criticized (Brown 
et al., 2015). Thus, particularly empirical evidence is critical regarding short-term, 
variable incentives. However, empirical results are not unambiguous. Several schol-
ars did not find detrimental effects of the mentioned components on risk taking or 
bank failure (e.g., Acrey et al., 2011; Iqbal & Vähämaa, 2019). Other findings indi-
cate rather complex relations between compensation, risk taking and further factors 
(e.g., Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015). Especially, on the operational level, positive effects 
of variable incentives on certain tasks can also be observed (Cole et al., 2015). Irre-
spective of these individual results in detail, incentive systems have increasingly 
become the focus of regulation following the financial crisis and variable short-term 
incentives have come under criticism. This debate led to changes in regulation, like 
the implementation of the “Institutsvergütungsverordnung” in Germany (first ver-
sion 2010), which provide detailed guidelines to set up feasible incentive systems. 
Accordingly, the area of results controls can be regarded as well researched and 
firmly established in the prevailing regulation.
In contrast, only a few scholars investigate the impact of core decision makers’ 
personal traits (as outcome of personnel controls) on banks’ risk culture. Findings 
indicate a detrimental effect of characteristics related to CEOs’ “self-preoccupation 
“, like narcissism and materialism (Bushman et al., 2018; Buyl et al., 2019) on risk 
taking. As outlined by the upper echelon theory (e.g., Hambrick, 2007), CEOs have 
the power to significantly shape organizations, and thus also determine organiza-
tional norms and values. Therefore, they also should exert a sustainable impact on 
banks’ risk culture. Accordingly, the identified observations in relation to risk taking 
also point to the development of a risk favoring culture. Regulators have understood 
these relations and mention the major impact that executives exert on the develop-
ment of an adequate risk culture by stressing the “tone from the top”. However, 
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while in other research areas the impact of particular CEO characteristics are well 
investigated, e.g. the impact of managerial overconfidence (e.g., Griffin & Varey, 
1996; Hirshleifer et al., 2012), with regard to a deeper understanding of the relation 
between CEO characteristics and risk culture there are still large gaps. For exam-
ple, further investigations regarding the impact of other traits, like overconfidence, 
machiavellianism or the big five, on risk culture and analyses of how these charac-
teristics can sustainably shape risk culture promise valuable insights. Additionally, a 
link between this research stream and research on personality traits in the context of 
risk taking in general seems warranted. The mentioned research on managerial over-
confidence (e.g., Griffin & Varey, 1996; Hirshleifer et al., 2012), but also on escala-
tion of commitment (e.g., Sleesman et al., 2012, 2018; Staw, 1976, 1981; Staw & 
Fox, 1977) constitute two very promising candidates for such a link, as they provide 
rich evidence on impacts of personality traits in the context of risk taking in general.
5.3  Changing and establishing the most appropriate risk culture
Several scholars evaluate a risk culture characterized by collaboration, trust, soli-
darity, and a healthy critical distance to mathematical risk management approaches 
as more appropriate (e.g., Mikes, 2011; Minto, 2016; Nguyen et al., 2019; Power, 
2009). Therefore, this literature argues for a shift in risk culture into this direction, 
irrespectively of the particular business model, as it mitigates excessive risk taking 
and unethical behavior, which in turn endangers the business model of any bank. 
In business practice, this recommendation can be seen as a call to question both 
the way risks are dealt with and the basic business conduct in order to develop an 
adequate risk culture embedded in an ethical background.
However, as indicated by the literature discussed in Sect.  4.4 changing risk 
culture depends on the configuration of the other management controls surround-
ing it. Particularly, the introduction of healthy skepticism  regarding mathematical 
risk management approaches requires a fundamental change in an industry that is 
guided by mathematical models. Moreover, as illustrated by Gendron et al. (2016), 
prevailing risk management practices and thus also risk culture as such are stabi-
lized by strong mechanisms, fostered by board members and consultancies, which 
inhibit a fundamental reflection on the appropriateness of the existing risk culture. 
Consequently, the required change is difficult to achieve with long-serving employ-
ees and business partners from the consulting industry. Yet, it can be enhanced by 
changes in educating future banks’ staff into the desired direction. Accordingly, rec-
ommendations made by regulators and the identified literature with regard to the 
vocational training of bank employees should be extended to junior employees and 
explicitly include teaching content at universities. Education in management control 
comprises both a number-driven management accounting-oriented perspective and a 
broader behavioral-oriented management control perspective (Gooneratne & Hoque, 
2013). Insights gained from this multi-perspectivity also can help to enrich the edu-
cation of future banks’ staff. Therefore, a closer link between management control 
and financial education should be sought.
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Additionally, as stressed by the findings discussed in Sect. 4.2.2, risk culture does 
not only vary across banks but also within banks, particularly Wahlström (2009) 
observes differences between operational staff and risk management staff, i.e. front 
and back office. Thus, in banks, different tasks are accompanied by a different view 
on risks. Bruce (2014) adds to this discussion that banks should incorporate differ-
ent worldviews, as a pluralistic view strengthens risk management and risk culture, 
and Sinha and Arena (2018) show that different stakeholders also have various per-
spectives, which need integration. To accomplish this goal instruments are needed 
that can bridge the gap between these different views and that promote a common 
goal-setting process with regard to risk orientation. Management control research 
has put forth instruments that help to promote a common goal formation of differ-
ently socialized parties. Target Costing is a prominent example here, which brings 
together representatives from the fields of marketing, R&D, production, and man-
agement accounting and directs them towards a common goal. Similar instruments 
are needed to foster a common perspective on risk culture within a single bank.
Finally, as already previously mentioned, the identified literature indicates an 
impact of national culture on banks’ risk taking and risk culture. For example, Car-
retta et  al. (2017) find that European supervisory regulators differ regarding their 
conceptualization of risk culture. However, evidence is ambiguous, i.e. especially 
individualism seems to either foster (Ashraf et al., 2016; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014) 
or attenuate risk taking (Illiashenko & Laidroo, 2020). Either way, national culture 
seems to exert an impact on the conceptualization of an adequate risk culture for a 
particular business model. This observation underscores the previous statement that 
banks must resort to individual concepts to establish a suitable risk culture, both in 
terms of assessment and in terms of the concrete design of the individual manage-
ment controls to achieve it.
5.4  A comprehensive framework
To cease dysfunctional developments with respect to risk culture, scholars stress 
the importance of embedding risk culture in an overall fitting organizational con-
text (e.g., Bott & Milkau, 2018; Gontarek, 2016; McConnell, 2013; Wood & Lewis, 
2018). In order to achieve this goal, literature provides many instruments which can 
be categorized into one of the discussed management control categories, e.g. ethical 
standards as part of cultural controls, incentive systems as results controls, training, 
recruitment, leadership, and communication as personnel controls as well as organi-
zational structure, accountability and supervision as action controls.
This discussion can be related to the frequent call for a more thorough under-
standing of the combination of different management controls (Bisbe & Otley, 
2004; Cardinal et al., 2010; Grabner & Moers, 2013; Mundy, 2010). The identified 
literature allows drawing conclusions regarding the combined effect of such man-
agement controls in relation to risk culture and individual risk taking. To structure 
this discussion, we follow the categorization in cultural, action, results, and person-
nel controls (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2017). Moreover, we focus on the main 
trajectories drawn from the identified literature to elaborate on the most important 
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dependency paths. The resulting model is depicted in Fig. 1. The arrows indicate the 
assumed direction of influence.
Within the discussed literature beside risk culture six factors are related to cul-
tural controls: Professional norms (e.g., Cohn et  al., 2017), national culture (e.g., 
Illiashenko & Laidroo, 2020; Kanagaretnam et  al., 2014), market and regulatory 
demands (Lim et  al., 2017), ethical standards (e.g. Awrey et  al., 2013; Fichter, 
2018), and organizational norms regarding the handling of failure (Gendron et al., 
2016). Professional norms and market demands affect risk taking across all banks 
similarly, while national culture only exerts the same impact on all banks within a 
cultural area. Also, regulatory demands can differ, as national regulators have differ-
ent conceptualizations of risk culture (Carretta et al., 2017). Either way, these fac-
tors are externally given. In contrast, banks develop their own norms regarding the 
handling of failure. Consequently, this aspect can be classified as an internal impact 
factor which constitutes one further element of cultural controls. Ethical standards 
comprise both, an external component shaped by the society and an internal com-
ponent developed within an organization, i.e. partly they are also elements of cul-
tural controls. These components affect the development of a common understand-
ing about adequate and ethically acceptable risk taking, i.e. risk culture. This risk 
culture affects individual risk taking, i.e. decision makers’ decisions which influence 
the bank’s risk level. In turn, these individual decisions and their outcomes form a 
further basis to develop a common understanding of the risk-taking behavior that is 
accepted within the bank and thus in turn also affect risk culture as the manifestation 
of this common understanding, as e.g. indicated by Drennan (2004).
Moreover, based on the previous discussion we posit that risk culture exerts an 
effect on personnel controls. For example, literature discussing the failure of Bar-
ings Bank illustrates how the desired risk culture (high risk – high return) lead to the 
recruitment of extreme risk takers (Drennan, 2004), which in turn again affected risk 
Fig. 1  Risk culture and management control systems
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culture through their individual decisions. In this context, scholars further discuss 
the following aspects: First, authors focus on individual characteristics particularly 
regarding CEOs (Bushman et al., 2018; Buyl et al., 2019; Ganon et al., 2017; Palvia 
et al., 2015). Second, literature analyzing case studies of banks’ failure and dysfunc-
tional risk culture points to the importance of knowledge (e.g., Drummond, 2002; 
Holland, 2010). Both aspects are closely related to hiring and training. Third, the 
discussion of failing banks due to excessive risk-taking highlights the detrimental 
effects of dysfunctional communication structures (Dellaportas et al., 2007), which 
are related to leadership as another component of personnel controls. McConnell 
(2013) and Muñiz et  al. (2020) also point to the importance of effective commu-
nication structures. While external factors exert an indirect effect on individual 
decisions, outcomes of personnel controls, like personality characteristics (related 
to hiring), knowledge (related to training) and communication structures (related to 
leadership) more directly affect individual behavior. Moreover, while external fac-
tors affecting cultural controls and thus the establishment of a particular risk cul-
ture are very stable and difficult to change, personnel controls, especially hiring and 
training, can provide the ground for a fundamental recalibration process, as they can 
be changed from within the bank in a more flexible way. Yet, as indicated by lit-
erature, in case of a lack of willingness to change, they also can exert a stabiliz-
ing effect on dysfunctional risk culture (e.g., Gendron et al., 2016). For this reason, 
when seeking to change risk culture, special attention should be paid to the person-
nel controls, as they can be directly influenced and at the same time have a direct 
influence on individual behavior, which in turn has a repercussion on risk culture.
As previously mentioned, a very broad literature exists that deals with the impact 
of various kinds of incentive systems, i.e. results controls. We assume that these 
incentive systems are an expression of the prevailing risk culture. However, in the 
course of a self-stabilizing processes, they determine individual risk taking, whose 
outcomes form the basis to develop a common understanding regarding reasonable 
risk handling and thus affect risk culture. Accordingly, also results controls not only 
are affected by risk culture but provide the input to shape risk culture.
Regarding action controls, within the discussed literature three factors can be 
identified: First, several scholars stress the importance of individual accountability 
to induce adequate risk taking (Cordery, 2007; Jackson, 2015), i.e. decision makers 
have to take responsibility for the outcomes of their decisions. If decision makers are 
accountable for their actions, they will think in more detail about their consequences 
and weigh up the appropriateness more thoroughly. Thus, accountability is a viable 
means to induce staff to act in accordance with the banks’ risk culture, while a lack 
of it undermines an alignment of employee behavior with it, i.e. risk culture affects 
individual risk taking through the implementation of accountability and account-
ability is an expression of a certain risk culture. Second, many authors in the context 
of dysfunctional risk culture and bank failure highlight the lack of clear supervision 
as antecedent of these failures (e.g., Cordery, 2007; Drennan, 2004; Drummond, 
2002). Accordingly, like accountability or incentive systems, supervision directs 
employees’ attention towards a risk-taking behavior which is in accordance with the 
bank’s risk culture. Thus, risk culture can influence risk taking through the prevail-
ing supervision processes. Third, Roy (2008) discusses how organizational structure 
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can affect the application of relevant information in daily risk-taking decisions and 
thereby points to a possible relation between structure, risk taking and risk culture. 
However, while supervision and accountability with a focus on risk taking are an 
expression of the prevailing risk culture, organizational structure serves many pur-
poses. Therefore, it is not reasonable to assume a direct effect of risk culture on the 
selection of the overall organizational structure. We rather posit an effect of struc-
ture on individual risk taking, as discussed by Roy (2008), which in turn then can, as 
outlined for the other aspects, influence risk culture.
This comprehensive overview of the in the identified literature most cited issues 
related to management control systems illustrates the complex relations between 
various components and the self-stabilizing effects within this system of effects. In 
order to effectively develop an adequate risk culture, banks have to elaborate on all 
components simultaneously, regulators have to become aware of their and the mar-
kets’ impact on risk culture and all parties have to understand detrimental effects 
of professional norms. Finally, so far, literature lacks deep insights regarding the 
exact relations between the identified components, i.e. which components exert 
which exact impact. Large parts of the findings are gained through single case stud-
ies, which do not allow for drawing causal conclusions. Therefore, more research is 
needed that elaborates on these causal relations.
6  Conclusion
The present paper provides the results of a systematic literature review focusing on 
risk culture in banks and their relation to management control systems. The identi-
fied articles were structured along three categories, i.e. assessment of risk culture, 
relation between risk culture and management controls (with the subcategories 
embeddedness of risk culture in overall management control packages, risk culture 
and cultural controls, risk culture and action controls, risk culture and results con-
trols, as well as risk culture and personnel controls) and development of banks’ risk 
culture over time. Based on the discussion of insights gained along these categories, 
we finally derived a comprehensive framework that illustrates the embeddedness of 
banks’ risk culture within a broader set of further management controls and several 
external factors.
Thereby, we provide a broad overview about extant literature related to banks’ 
risk culture. However, it also suffers from several limitations. First, we focus on 
research published in peer reviewed journals in English. Consequently, we abstract 
from research output that is provided in other languages and in other outlets. We 
decided to apply these selection criteria on the one hand to keep the discussed litera-
ture within a manageable range. On the other hand, we focus on this literature, as it 
can be perceived internationally and thus should have the strongest impact on further 
research. Nevertheless, an investigation of country-specific debates or publications 
that are oriented towards practitioners would provide additional valuable insights. 
Second, risk culture is a soft, partly vague phenomenon with unclear boundaries. 
Therefore, it is difficult to define clear selection criteria for the relevant literature. 
For instance, research of overconfidence or escalation of commitment provides 
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valuable insights into psychological and structural determinants of decisions in risky 
contexts. Thus, also these fields of research – as only two examples of a broad range 
of literature – deserve further attention in order to understand the relation between 
individual and structural antecedents of risk culture. Similarly, the particular ele-
ments of management control systems are difficult to delimit, i.e. there is no clear-
cut decision criterion definable that states which elements in the management pro-
cess are part of a management control system and which are not. This might result in 
a somewhat arbitrary selection of papers which do not focus explicitly on manage-
ment control systems. Third, the selection process as such contains choices which 
results in a limited perspective on the literature, i.e. the chosen databases.
However, despite these limitations, the present literature overview provides a 
broad perspective on extant research related to risk culture in banks. It summarizes 
and interprets this literature, synthesizes its findings, shows relations between risk 
culture and management controls and highlights promising paths for future research.
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